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Comment
RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN IN
MISSOURI
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment will examine several actions which are available
in Missouri against the father of an illegitimate child. The actions
are arbitrarily divided into two categories: those which accrue dur-
ing the father's lifetime and those which arise upon his death
against his estate. Each cause of action will be examined separately
so that the requirements of and obstacles to the use of the action
may be examined in depth. The area of illegitimate children's rights
is a rapidly evolving one. The attitude of the courts toward such
children has undergone a rather drastic change in favor of increased
rights and equal treatment for illegitimate children. This comment,
however, is limited to a consideration of actions which are presently
available against an illegitimate father in Missouri.
II. ACTIONS ACCRUING DURING THE FATHER'S LIFETIME
A. Actions for Support
1. Duty of Support
Traditionally in Missouri, the father of an illegitimate child
had no legal obligation to provide support for the child.' In Easley
v. Gordon2 the mother of an illegitimate child brought suit to en-
force the father's express promise to pay for the support of the child.
The court denied relief, reasoning that since the primary duty of
support was on the mother of an illegitimate child, her performance
of that duty was not sufficient consideration to support the father's
promise to pay. The finding that the duty of support of an illegiti-
mate child fell on the mother, and not on the father, was based on
the court's interpretation of the common law as adopted by Mis-
souri.3 The court found that, in the absence of a statute to the
contrary, the duty of support fell on the mother.4
1. Sponable v. Owens, 92 Mo. App. 174, 178 (K.C. Ct. App. 1902); Easley v. Gordon,
51 Mo. App. 637 (St. L. Ct. App. 1892).
2. 51 Mo. App. 637 (St. L. Ct. App. 1892).
3. § 6561, RSMo 1889 (now § 1.010, RSMo 1969).
4. Easley v. Gordon, 51 Mo. App. 637, 641 (St. L. Ct. App. 1892).
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Subsequent cases held that a father had no statutory duty to
support his illegitimate child. In James - v. Hutton,5 the minor
illegitimate children brought suit for support, arguing that the crim-
inal non-support statute6 demonstrated a legislative intent to im-
pose a duty of support on the father. The court, however, held that
criminal statutes should be strictly construed and no duty of sup-
port should be imposed on the father in the absence of an express
declaration to that effect. In State ex rel. Canfield v. Porterfield,7
the mother of an illegitimate child argued that the 1919 versions of
sections 452.150 and 452.160, RSMo 1969,8 gave the mother of an
illegitimate child a cause of action against the father for support.
The court held that the statutes only applied when the father was
seeking custody or control of the child, or the child's services, earn-
ings, or property. Thus, where the putative father avoided all rela-
tionship with the child, the common law rule remained unchanged.
The Kansas City Court of Appeals, in James - v. Hutton,'
declared that the failure of the Missouri legislature to enact a stat-
ute authorizing a cause of action for support of an illegitimate child
against the father was a declaration of the public policy of Missouri
against such a cause of action. The court noted the unsuccessful
attempts to enact legislation which would change the common law
rule, and concluded:
By such action the General Assembly has said that the public
policy of the State of Missouri is the law under the decisions of the
5. 373 S.W.2d 167 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
6. § 559.350, RSMo 1959 (now §§ 559.353, .356, RSMo 1969).
7. 222 Mo. App. 553, 292 S.W. 85 (K.C. Ct. App. 1927).
8. §§ 1813, 1814, 1814a, RSMo 1919 (now §§ 452.150, .160, RSMo 1969). Section
451.150, RSMo 1969, states:
The father and mother living apart are entitled to an adjudication of the circuit
court as to their powers, rights and duties in respect to the custody and control and
the services and earnings and management of the property of their unmarried minor
children without any preference as between the said father and mother, and neither
the father nor the mother has any right paramount to that of the other in respect
to the custody and control or the services and earnings or of the management of
the property of their said unmarried minor children; pending such adjudication the
father or mother who actually has the custody and control of said unmarried minor
children shall have the sole right to the custody and control and to the services and
earnings and to the management of the property of said unmarried minor children.
Section 452.160, RSMo 1969, states:
The terms of section 452.150 shall apply to children born out of wedlock and to
children born in wedlock, and the terms "father and mother," "parent," "child,"
shall apply without reference to whether a child was born in lawful wedlock.
9. 373 S.W.2d 167 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
[Vol. 40
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Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal which have held that there
is no civil obligation for the support of illegitimate children as far
as the father-either alleged or admitted-is concerned.'"
Just five years later, however, this public policy and the case
law following the rule of Easley v. Gordon" was swept aside by the
Missouri Supreme Court in R - v. R -. 11 In the case, the court
stated that recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court'3
compel the conclusion that the proper construction of our statutory
provisions relating to the obligations and rights of parents affords
illegitimate children a right equal with that of legitimate children
to require support by their fathers. Prior cases to the contrary are
no longer to be followed. 4
The basis for the decision in R - v. R - was that discrimina-
tion between legitimate and illegitimate children for the purpose of
determining the right to compel support by a father was a violation
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,'5 as
well as a violation of article I, sections 2 and 14 of the Missouri
constitution. Thus, in Missouri, the father of an illegitimate child,
after R - v. R -, has a legal duty of support coextensive with
his duty to provide support for a legitimate child.
Missouri has recognized the duty of support as a legal obliga-
tion."6 According to the Missouri Supreme Court: 7
The father owes a duty to nurture, support, educate and protect
his child, and the child has the right to call on him for the dis-
charge of this duty. These obligations and rights are imposed and
conferred by the laws of nature; and public policy, for the good of
society, will not permit or allow the father to irrevocably divest
himself of or to abandon them at his mere will or pleasure."
10. Id. at 169.
11. 51 Mo. App. 637 (St. L. Ct. App. 1892).
12. 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
13. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability
Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). Levy dealt with an illegitimate child's right to recover for the
wrongful death of his mother. The Court held that to deny recovery on the basis of the
illegitimacy was a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
the Unitbd States Constitution. Glona concerned the right of a mother to recover for the
wrongful death of her illegitimate child.
14. R - v. R , 431 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Mo. 1968) (citations omitted).
15. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), in which the United States Supreme Court
held that it is a denial of equal protection to deny illegitimate children the right to compel
support from their father if the state allows legitimate children such a right.
16. Worthington v. Worthington, 212 Mo. App. 216, 253 S.W. 443 (St. L. Ct. App. 1923).
17. In re Scarritt, 76 Mo. 565 (1882).
18. Id. at 584.
1975]
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This obligation exists between father and child, the father having a
duty to provide support and the child having the right to receive
support from his father. Traditionally in Missouri, however, the
right to enforce the father's duty of support does not lie with the
child. In Worthington v. Worthington,9 a guardian acting on behalf
of seven minor children attempted to enforce the children's right to
support against their father. It was held that the children had no
right to maintain a direct action against the father for their support.
The rationale for the decision was that permitting children to bring
such an action would encourage suits between children and their
parents, thereby undermining parental discipline and eventually
the family structure itself. The Missouri Supreme Court in In re L
20 may have changed the Worthington rule and given children
the right to enforce the father's duty of support. Suit was brought
by plaintiff, a minor, by her next friend, the mother and natural
guardian, to compel the father to provide support for the child. The
court did not mention the Worthington decision, but focused on
whether the child's mother was a proper next friend to represent the
child in such a proceeding. Thus, it is at least arguable that the
court overruled Worthington by implication, thereby allowing the
child to maintain an action to enforce the father's duty of support.
Because Worthington was not discussed, however, it is still uncer-
tain how the court would rule if directly presented with the question
of whether a child has a cause of action for support. Even though
In re L - was somewhat unclear whether a cause of action for
future support would lie with the child, the court clearly held that
the mother is a proper party to a cause of action against the father
for future support.
2. The Child's Right to Support
The father's duty to support the child arises at birth and con-
tinues until the father's death"- or the emancipation of the child,22
whichever occurs first. A father's duty of support clearly ends at his
death. With emancipation, however, it is not so easy to pinpoint
when the duty of support terminates. Emancipation is defined as
the voluntary termination of the parent-child relationship. 23 The
19. 212 Mo. App. 216, 253 S.W. 443 (St. L. Ct. App. 1923).
20. 499 S.W.2d 490 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
21. Gardine v. Cottey, 360 Mo. 681, 230 S.W.2d 731 (En Banc 1950).
22. Green v. Green, 234 S.W.2d 350 (St. L. Mo. App. 1950); Swenson v. Swenson, 241
Mo. App. 21, 227 S.W.2d 103 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950).
23. Wurth v. Wurth, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. En Banc 1959).
(Vol. 40
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termination of the relationship is a question of fact to be determined
by the jury.24 The parent's intention to emancipate the child may
be shown either by express agreement or it may be implied from the
actions of the parties.2
Several factual situations raise presumptions as to the exist-
ence of an emancipation. First, it is presumed that a child is eman-
cipated when he attains the age of legal majority.28 Furthermore, if
a child below the age of majority marries, he is presumed emanci-
pated because he has assumed obligations inconsistent with those
of the parent-child relationship.27 Likewise, if a child under the age
of majority joins the military, he will be presumed to be emanci-
pated because he has put himself under the control of the govern-
ment, a relationship inconsistent with the parent's right of care and
control.28 The underlying theory of emancipation in these situations
is that the child is no longer in the care and custody of his father;
some other person or organization has assumed the responsibility to
care for the welfare of the child, and the father is relieved of his
corresponding duty of support.29
3. Methods of Obtaining Support
In Missouri, a third party who wishes to enforce the father's
duty to support his illegitimate children has two alternatives. The
third party may provide support and seek reimbursement in a
"common law suit," or seek an order for continuing support in
connection with a filiation proceeding. The ruling in R - v. R
90 seems to dictate that cases involving support of legitimate
children be precedent in actions for the support of illegitimate chil-
dren.
a. Common Law Suit
Traditionally in Missouri, a mother who has expended her own
money in supporting her child can recover the amount expended
24. Spurgeon v. Mission State Bank, 151 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S.
782 (1946).
25. Wurth v. Wurth, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. En Banc 1959).
26. Green v. Green, 234 S.W.2d 350 (St. L. Mo. App. 1950).
27. Steckler v. Steckler, 293 S.W.2d 129 (Spr. Mo. App. 1956).
28. Green v. Green, 234 S.W.2d 350 (St. L. Mo. App. 1950); Swenson v. Swenson, 241
Mo. App. 21, 227 S.W.2d 103 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950).
29. See cases cited note 28 supra.
30. 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
1975]
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from the father.' In order for the mother to recover, she must show
that she had lawful custody of the child" and that her expenditures
were for "necessaries" for the child.33
The requirement of showing that the mother had lawful custody
is minimal and is met unless the mother's custody has been wrong-
ful. Only two Missouri cases have allowed the father to defeat the
mother's claim for reimbursement. In Assman v. Assman,34 the St.
Louis Court of Appeals denied recovery where the mother had spir-
ited the children away from the custody of the father. Similarly, the
Kansas City Court of Appeals, in Wills v. Baker,5 denied reim-
bursement to the mother for amounts expended while her four chil-
dren lived with her. The father had been given custody of the chil-
dren by court order, but the children, without the father's consent,
left his home and resided with their mother. The underlying ration-
ale in each of these cases was that the mother had obtained custody
wrongfully; thus, any expenses incurred by her could not be reim-
bursed since the she was acting merely as a volunteer in supporting
the children. Certainly, in the case of illegitimate children it will be
even more infrequent that the mother does not have actual and
lawful custody of the child. Accordingly, the question of proper
custody should arise only in those instances where the father has
custody of the child because of a court order or the mother's consent.
After a showing that she has proper custody of the child, the
mother must prove the amounts expended in providing for the
child's necessaries.3 In producing evidence of the amount expended
the mother need not prove each item with the particularity which
would be required of a creditor suing on a debt. 7 The amount of
recovery is determined by the cost of the necessaries provided. The
father's duty is to support his child, and to do this he must provide
for the reasonable needs of his child.3 1 What constitutes reasonable
31. Berkley v. Berkley, 246 S.W.2d 804 (Mo. 1952); Swenson v. Swenson, 241 Mo. App.
21, 227 S.W.2d 103, 106 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950); Broemmer v. Broemmer, 219 S.W.2d 300 (St.
L. Mo. App. 1949).
32. Hunter v. Schwertfeger, 407 S.W.2d 606 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966); Broemmer v. Broem-
mer, 219 S.W.2d 300 (St. L. Mo. App. 1949).
33. Anderson v. Anderson, 437 S.W.2d 704 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969); Berkley v. Berkley,
246 S.W.2d 804 (Mo. 1952).
34. 192 Mo. App. 678, 179 S.W. 957 (St. L. Ct. App. 1915).
35. 240 Mo. App. 705, 214 S.W.2d 748 (K.C. Ct. App. 1948).
36. Hunter v. Schwertfeger, 407 S.W.2d 606 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966); Broemmerv. Broem-
mer, 219 S.W.2d 300 (St. L. Mo. App. 1949).
37. Josey v. Ford, 338 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. 1960).
38. Anderson v. Anderson, 437 S.W.2d 704 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
[Vol. 40
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needs, or necessaries, has never been conclusively decided, but in
Josey v. Forde39 the Missouri Supreme Court stated:
"[N]ecessaries" include food, drink, clothing, washing, medicine,
instruction, a suitable place of residence, and in nearly every fam-
ily some comforts in excess of the strict necessities of life are en-
joyed and treated as necessaries. . . . And it is a matter of com-
mon knowledge that food, clothing and expenses in sending a child
to school are necessaries."0
The mother of a child is not the only party who may bring a
"common law suit" to recover amounts expended for the benefit of
the child. Other parties who furnish necessaries to a child may also
bring suit for reimbursement. In order for a third party to recover,
he must show that the father has not provided for the child." Fur-
thermore, the right of any third party to recover is said to rest upon
an actual agreement or one implied by law for the fulfillment of the
father's duty to support his child. 42 If the third party does not rely
upon the father for reimbursement for the necessaries furnished,
then no agreement will be implied and no recovery allowed since the
goods and services were furnished as a gratuity.43
The common law suit for necessaries provided is a relatively
inexpensive method to enforce a child's right to support when the
defendant father is subject to jurisdiction and has the means to
satisfy a lump sum judgment. The main disadvantage to such a suit
is that the plaintiff must first furnish the necessaries with his own
funds and then suits must be brought periodically to recover
amounts expended. The primary importance of the common law
suit is to recover amounts expended before an order of support is
obtained.
b. Filiation Proceeding
While the Missouri Supreme Court, in R - v. R ,44
clearly held that an illegitimate child has the right to support equal
to that of a legitimate child, the type of proceeding to be used to
obtain such support was not decided. The preferred method, how-
39. 338 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. 1960).
40. Id. at 15 (citations omitted).
41. Brosius v. Barker, 154 Mo. App. 657, 136 S.W. 18 (Spr. Ct. App. 1911).
42. Schwieter v. Heathman's Estate, 264 S.W.2d 932 (St. L.Mo. App. 1954).
43. Id.
44. 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
1975]
7
Cowherd: Cowherd: Rights of Illegitimate Children
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1975
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
ever, soon became apparent." First, the child by a next friend
should bring an action for a declaratory judgment that the defen-
dant is, in fact, the child's father. Then, the mother or other guard-
ian of the child may bring suit for the benefit of the child in order
to obtain support payments. In addition, In re L - apparently
allows the child by a next friend to bring such a suit.
Two situations must be distingiuished in bringing a suit for
declaratory judgment. The first situation is where the mother is
married to a man other than the actual father of the child at the
time the child is born. In In re L _, a married woman brought
suit as an individual and as next friend for her child, seeking a
judgment declaring the defendant to be the father of the child. The
defendant argued that Lord Mansfield's Rule, 47 which states that
the declaration of a husband or wife cannot be admitted into evi-
dence in order to bastardize any issue born during the marriage,
would prevent the mother of the child from testifying that her child
was illegitimate. The court, however, allowed the mother to testify,
stating that Lord Mansfield's Rule was not part of the Missouri
common law." Next, the court was confronted with the common law
presumption that a child born in wedlock was a legitimate offspring
of the marriage. The court noted that today the presumption is a
rebuttable, evidentiary presumption which is overcome by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence to the contrary.49 Accordingly, the
court held that the recorded admissions of the defendant were suffi-
cient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. Finally, the court
held that the mother could act as next friend for the child even
though there may exist a conflict of interest between the mother and
child."
The second important situation arises where the mother is not
married at the time the child is born. Here, as in the first situation,
the burden of proof as to the issue of paternity rests upon the plain-
tiff.5 There are no presumptions involved which help or hinder the
plaintiff. Furthermore, there appears to be no conflict of interest
45. In re L - , 461 S.W.2d 529 (Spr. Mo. App. 1970).
46. 499 S.W.2d 490 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
47. Enunciated in Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777).
48. In re L -, 499 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
49. Id. at 492.
50. Id. at 494.
51. L - M - B - v. S - F - S - , 504 S.W.2d 233 (Mo. App., D.K.C.
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between mother and child which would prevent the mother from
functioning as next friend in the child's suit for a declaratory judg-
ment.
In both of the above situations, if the declaratory judgment
action is successful, the mother should ask the court to award her
child support. The mother, as natural guardian, is obligated to sup-
port her illegitimate child. 3 Thus, she has a direct interest in the
outcome of this litigation and is a proper party to maintain the
action."4 Because an illegitimate child now has a right to support
equal to that of a legitimate child,5 cases dealing with support of
legitimate children should be precedent in an action for support of
an illegitimate child. The common law rule was that the father has
the primary duty to support his child. 6 An order for continuing
payments of child support is a prior judicial determination of the
magnitude of this duty of support. 7 The father and the mother
cannot alter or determine the extent of the father's obligation by
agreement between themselves. The rationale for this rule is that
the mother is merely acting as trustee for the purpose of enforcing
the child's right to support. Thus, tle court has the final authority
to determine the monetary value of the right of support, and the
mother is unable to substitute her judgment for that of the court by
contracting to accept less.
The amount of the support order is determined by the needs of
the child and the father's station in life and financial condition.5 9
Missouri courts have held that the father has a duty of support
regardless of the fact that the mother or the child has independent
means or property of their own.6" Furthermore, a child is entitled to
more than the bare necessities of life if the circumstances so war-
rant." Obviously the court, in deciding the amount of support, will
define the child's "needs" to include food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, school expenses, and recreational expenses.2 The court, in
53. Easley v. Gordon, 51 Mo. App. 637 (St. L. Ct. App. 1892).
54. In re L - , 499 S.W.2d 490 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
55. R - v. R _ 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
56. Brosam v. Brosam, 437 S.W.2d 694 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
57. Hunter v. Schwertfeger, 407 S.W.2d 606 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966).
58. Robinson v. Robinson, 268 Mo. 703, 186 S.W. 1032 (1916); Messmer v. Messmer,
222 S.W.2d 521 (St. L. Mo. App. 1949).
59. Anderson v. Anderson, 437 S.W.2d 704 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969); Brosam v. Brosam,
437 S.W.2d 694 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
60. Brosam v. Brosam, 437 S.W.2d 694, 696 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
61. Houston v. Snyder, 440 S.W.2d 156 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969); Anderson v. Anderson,
437 S.W.2d 704 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
62. Bagley v. Bagley, 460 S.W.2d 736 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970); Anderson v. Anderson,
1975]
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addition, will consider the father's ability to provide support, view-
ing his assets as well as his income." Nevertheless, courts will not
order an award so large as to stifle the father's incentive to work. 4
The judicial determination of the amount of the father's duty
of support is a final decree for purposes of execution. 5 Since the
relationship of parent and child is a continuing one, however, the
order should be subject to modification if there is a change of cir-
cumstances, as is true with respect to an order for support of a
legitimate child.66 Facts justifying such a modification include a
change in the child's needs, 7 a change in the costs of the child's
needs,66 and a change in the father's ability to provide support."
An order of support for an illegitimate child should be enforce-
able by execution and garnishment, as are other orders of support."
Missouri courts have, in the past, refused to use the contempt power
to enforce any type of order for support of a wife.7' Support for the
wife was deemed to be damages for the husband's breach of the
marriage contract." Accordingly, use of the contempt power to im-
prison the husband for failure to pay support was held to violate the
Missouri constitutional prohibition of imprisonment for debt.73
With little logical support, the same prohibition on the use of the
court's contempt power was applied to obligations for child sup-
port.74 Missouri's new Dissolution of Marriage Act75 gives courts the
right to use the contempt power to enforce support obligations, with
respect to both the wife and the child. Since the new dissolution law
cannot alter the constitutional prohibition of imprisonment for
debt, the basis for the change must be that the new law has changed
the rationale upon which support to the wife is awarded; support is
no longer awarded as damages for breach of contract, but solely on
437 S.W.2d 704 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
63. Anderson v. Anderson, 437 S.W.2d 704 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
64. McCann v. McCann, 448 S.W.2d 323 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
65. Partney v. Partney, 442 S.W.2d 117 (St. L. Mo. App. 1969); Steckler v. Steckler,
293 S.W.2d 129 (Spr. Mo. App. 1956).
66. Anderson v. Anderson, 437 S.W.2d 704 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
67. Bagley v. Bagley, 460 S.W.2d 736 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970).
68. Smolly v. Hoffman, 458 S. W.2d 579 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970).
69. Anderson v. Anderson, 437 S.W.2d 704 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
70. Partney v. Partney, 442 S.W.2d 117 (St. L. Mo. App. 1969); Steckler v. Steckler,
293 S.W.2d 129 (Spr. Mo. App. 1956).
71. Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 221 S.W. 1066 (En Banc 1920).
72. Id.
73. Mo, CONST. art. I, § 11.
74. Partney v. Partney, 442 S.W.2d 117 (St. L. Mo. App. 1969).
75. §§ 452.325.5, .345.4, RSMo 1973 Supp.
[Vol. 40
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the basis of need and the husband's continuing obligation to support
his wife and child.78 Thus, the use of the contempt power should not
violate the prohibition of imprisonment for debt, because the court
would be using it to enforce the husband's continuing obligation of
support rather than a contractual debt. If the Missouri courts so
hold, then under R - v. R I and Gomez v. Perez,8 the duty
to support illegitimates could be enforced by the use of the con-
tempt power. The impact of Missouri's Dissolution of Marriage Act
on the attitude of the courts toward parental responsibility for child
support is unknown. One section of the Act 9 seems to indicate that
the Missouri legislature intended for both parents to have an obliga-
tion to support their children and that the financial resources of
each parent are to be considered in determinng what portion of
support each parent is to provide. Although the Act does not apply
to an action for support of an illegitimate child, it can be argued
that the Act represents the state's child support policy. Therefore,
the factors which a court must consider in awarding support for a
legitimate child should also be considered in awarding support for
an illegitimate child.
The Missouri Supreme Court in Williams v. Williams" indi-
cated that its attitude toward the father's duty of support may be
changing. The defendant and his wife were divorced in 1969. There
were four children of the marriage. Defendant and his wife were
each awarded custody of two children. Defendant later remarried.
The former wife brought suit to force the defendant to support fully
the children in her custody. The court noted that traditionally in
Missouri, the father had the primary duty of support for his chil-
dren. Nevertheless, because the plaintiff and defendant had nearly
identical incomes and because the principal object of a child sup-
port order is to provide for the welfare of all the children involved,
the court stated that it was unreasonable to take money from the
father (and thereby the children in his custody) in order to award
support for his children in the custody of his former wife. The court's
reasoning should be particularly applicable to actions for support of
illegitimate children, because the father of an illegitimate child will
often have other children to support. In such situations, the
76. See §§ 452.335, .340, RSMo 1973 Supp.
77. 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
78. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
79. § 452.340, RSMo 1974 Supp.
80. 510 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
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mother's financial resources, as well as the additional support obli-
gation of the father, should be considered by the court in determin-
ing the amount of child support to be awarded.
B. Breach of Promise to Marry
Although Missouri courts traditionally have refused to give ille-
gitimate children the right to support from their fathers," the harsh-
ness of that result has sometimes been avoided by use of the well-
established action for breach of a promise to marry. This has al-
lowed mothers to obtain indirect support for their illegitimate chil-
dren."2
The action for breach of promise to marry is one in contract,
although it has some characteristics of a tort action as far as dam-
ages are concerned.83 The basis of the suit is that the parties entered
into a contract, each promising to marry the other. Like any other
contract, both parties at the time of the promise must have had the
capacity to enter into a valid marriage." Thus, any promise of mar-
riage made by or to a person who, to the knowledge of the parties,
has a living spouse is absolutely void and will not give rise to an
action for breach of promise, even though the promise is not to be
performed until after the death or divorce of the spouse.85 The court,
however, will presume that the plaintiff had the capacity to enter
into a contract to marry," and incapacity to contract marriage is an
affirmative defense which the defendant must plead and prove.8 7
The plaintiff-mother's most difficult burden is, of course, to show
that the defendant, in fact, promised to marry her. If such a promise
can be shown, then the mother is entitled to recover unless the
defendant can prove that the plaintiff lacked the capacity to con-
tract to marry,88 or that the plaintiff does not love the defendant.89
The latter is said to be a complete and substantive defense to such
81. Sponable v. Owens, 92 Mo. App. 174 (K.C. Ct. App. 1902); Easley v. Gordon, 51
Mo. App. 637 (St. L. Ct. App. 1892).
82. Liese v. Meyer, 143 Mo. 547, 45 S.W. 282 (1898); Rebg v. Giancola, 391 S.W.2d 934
(St. L. Mo. App. 1965); Erwin v. Jones, 192 Mo. App. 326, 180 S.W. 428 (Spr. Ct. App. 1915).
83. Adams v. Griffith, 51 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Mo. 1943).
84. Fitch v. Coats, 167 S.W.2d 478 (St. L. Mo. App. 1943).
85. Id. at 485.
86. Chapman v. Brown, 192 Mo. App. 78, 179 S.W. 774 (K.C. Ct. App. 1915).
87. Spears v. DeClue, 149 S.W.2d 461 (St. L. Mo. App. 1941); Chapman v. Brown, 192
Mo. App. 78, 179 S.W. 774 (K.C. Ct. App. 1915).
88. Id.
89. Parks v. Marshall, 14 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. 1929).
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an action." The rationale is that one of the implied conditions of a
marriage is that the parties love, cherish, and respect each other.
Accordingly, if the plaintiff does not tell the defendant that she
does not love him, then her conduct is tantamount to fraud on the
defendant." The mere fact that the parties had intercourse or even
cohabited before marriage is not a defense to an action for breach
of promise to marry.92 The fact that the plaintiff was unchaste,
however, is a defense if it is specially pleaded.13 Finally, the general
rule is that a breach of the promise to marry gives an instant right
of action and an offer by the defendant to fulfill his promise after
suit is brought is no defense. 4
In a few Missouri cases, the mother was able to convince the
court to include, or at least consider, child support, in assessing
damages for breach of the promise to marry. As early as 1898, the
Missouri Supreme Court, in Liese v. Meyer,95 stated:
The sum allowed the plaintiff, $10,000, is not, under the circum-
stances of this case [plaintiff had borne the defendant's child], so
excessive as to indicate passion, prejudice, or misconduct of the
jury. It is a sum, capitalized at 6% per annum, sufficient to yield
her $50 per month, which can scarcely be looked upon as an extrav-
agant amount for the support of herself and her child. 6
A few years later the Springfield Court of Appeals appproved a
damage instruction which allowed the plaintiff-mother to recover
for "the support and maintenance of said child."97 In 1965, the St.
Louis Court of Appeals allowed a woman to recover maintenance for
the defendant's illegitimate child as well as any medical expenses
due to the pregnancy and birth of the child.9" The primary advan-
tage of the cause of action for breach of promise to marry is that the
plaintiff-mother may recover as damages, not only support for her
child, but also for injury to her reputation,99 feelings, affection, and
pride,"00 for the loss of employment during and after the pregnancy,
90. Id.
91. Id. at 595.
92. Huckaba v. Carmada, 293 S.W. 797 (Spr. Mo. App. 1927).
93. Rehg v. Giancola, 391 S.W.2d 934 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
94. Chapman v. Brown, 192 Mo. App. 78, 179 S.W. 774 (K.C. Ct. App. 1915).
95. 143 Mo. 547, 45 S.W. 282 (1898).
96. Id. at 562, 45 S.W. at 285-86 (emphasis added).
97. Erwin v. Jones, 192 Mo. App. 326, 180 S.W. 428 (Spr. Ct. App. 1916).
98. Rehg v. Giancola, 391 S.W.2d 934 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
99. Adams v. Griffith, 51 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Mo. 1943); Rehg v. Giancola, 391 S.W.2d
934 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
100. Trammell v. Vaughan, 158 Mo. 214, 59 S.W. 79 (1900).
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and for any increased burden she may have in gaining employment
because she is a single woman with a child."' Furthermore, the fact
that the plaintiff was seduced (i.e., a woman of previous chaste
character was induced to consent to unlawful sexual relations by
persuasion and the promise to marry)' ° may be shown to aggravate
the plaintiff's damages."'2 On the other hand, if the parties lived
together and there was no seduction, then this fact may be consid-
ered in mitigation of damages. °4 It should be noted that Missouri
does not allow the plaintiff to recover exemplary or punitive dam-
ages in this action.'0 ' One final point should be considered in decid-
ing whether to bring suit for breach of promise to marry in order to
gain indirect support for an illegitimate child. As previously stated,
the action is one for breach of contract. Because the damages are,
therefore, in the nature of a contractual debt, the Missouri constitu-
tional prohibition of imprisonment for debt' 0 may preclude use of
the court's contempt power to enforce the judgment.
C. Seduction and Debauchment
Seduction and debauchment are ancient causes of action in
Missouri.' 7 Nevertheless, these tort actions may still serve useful
functions in a suit against the father of an illegitimate child by
allowing a parent of the mother of an illegitimate child to recover
any medical expenses connected with the pregnancy and birth. De-
bauchment is an action brought by a parent against a defendant
who has had intercourse with the parent's previously chaste daugh-
ter.' 8 Seduction is similar, but the parent must show not only inter-
course with the daughter, but also that the sexual acts were accom-
plished by either force and violence or artifice and blandishment on
the part of the defendant.'09 The basis for the two actions is that the
101. Rehg v. Giancola, 391 S.W.2d 934 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
102. Clemons v. Seba, 131 Mo. App. 378, 111 S.W. 522 (K.C. Ct. App. 1908).
103. Trammell v. Vaughn, 158 Mo. 214, 59 S.W. 79 (1900); Rehg v. Giancola, 391
S.W.2d 934 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
104. Huckaba v. Cannada, 293 S.W. 797 (Spr. Mo. App. 1927).
105. Adams v. Griffith, 51 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Mo. 1943); Trammel v. Vaughan, 158
Mo. 214, 59 S.W. 79 (1900).
106. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 11.
107. Comer v. Taylor, 82 Mo. 341 (1884); Heinrichs v. Kerchner, 35 Mo. 378 (1865);
Vassel v. Cole, 10 Mo. 634 (1847).
108. Comer v. Taylor, 82 Mo. 341 (1884); Smith v. Young, 26 Mo. App. 575 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1887).
109. Owens v. Fanning, 205 S.W. 69 (St. L. Mo. App. 1918); Smith v. Young, 26 Mo.
App. 575 (St. L. Ct. App. 1887).
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parent should be able to recover for the loss of the daughter's serv-
ices during the pregnancy.11° The actions for seduction or debauch-
ment are based upon the supposed loss of services and therefore
traditionally can be maintained only by the person to whom the
services were due-i.e., the father, who as head of the family was
entitled to his daughter's services."' It is clear that the daughter-
mother cannot maintain either action herself.112 iun an action for
debauchment, damages are limited to those resulting from the loss
of services and expenses incurred due to the childbirth. The dam-
ages in an action for seduction, in addition, include disgrace and
dishonor cast upon the plaintiff and family;1 exemplary or punitive
damages are also recoverable.1 The amount of damages in either
action is within the province of the jury. One case held that it was
reversible error to allow the plaintiff to testify as to a set dollar
amount of damages.1
Boedges v. Dinges10 should serve as a reminder to Missouri
attorneys that the causes of action for seduction and debauchment
are still very much alive and serve as a useful method of recovering
from the natural father medical expenses incurred during the preg-
nancy and birth of an illegitimate child.
Ill. ACTIONS AGAINST THE FATHER'S ESTATE
A. Equitable Adoption
In Missouri, a legitimate child has the right to a share of his
father's intestate estate 7 or, if the father has a will, the child has
rights as a pretermitted heir if he is not mentioned in the will.11s On
the other hand, an illegitimate child shares only in his mother's
intestate estate"' and an illegitimate child is not within the protec-
tion of the pretermitted heir statute if the child is not mentioned in
the natural father's will.' These different standards, based upon a
110. Comer v. Taylor, 82 Mo. 341 (1884); Boedges v. Dinges, 428 S.W.2d 930 (St. L.Mo.
App. 1968); Koenke v. Bauer, 162 Mo. App. 718, 145 S.W. 506 (K.C. Ct. App. 1912).
111. Heinrichs v. Kerchner, 35 Mo. 378 (1865); Vassel v. Cole, 10 Mo. 634 (1847).
112. Jordan v. Hovey, 72 Mo. 574 (1880).
113. Comer v. Taylor, 82 Mo. 341 (1884); Morgan v. Ross, 74 Mo. 318 (1881); Smith v.
Young, 26 Mo. App. 575 (St. L. Ct. App. 1887).
114. Comer v. Taylor, 82 Mo. 341 (1884); Smith v. Young, 26 Mo. App. 575 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1887).
115. Smith v. Young, 26 Mo. App. 575 (St. L. Ct. App. 1887).
116. 428 S.W.2d 930 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968).
117. § 474.010, RSMo 1969.
118. § 474.240, RSMo 1969.
119. § 474.060, RSMo 1969.
120. Banks v. Galbraith, 149 Mo. 529, 51 S.W. 105 (1899).
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legitimacy-illegitimacy distinction, would not appear to be subject
to a constitutional attack based on the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. The United States Supreme Court, in
Labine v. Vincent, 2' held that a state could deny inheritance rights
from the father to an illegitimate child who had not been legitimized
by the father or provided for in the father's will. The harshness of
this treatment of illegitimate children can be substantially lessened
by the use of the action of equitable adoption if the child has been
an actual member of his father's family. 1' Equitable adoption is an
action in equity to enforce a contract to adopt. The child seeks a
judgment declaring him to be the adopted child of a named dece-
dent."'3 Obviously, such an action is necessary only where there has
been no formal, legal adoption. The decree of equitable adoption
will not place the adopted child in the same status as one legally
adopted, but it does allow the equitably adopted child to inherit
from the estate of the adoptive parent.'24
The first hurdle which a petitioner for a decree of equitable
adoption must overcome is whether such an action is barred by
either the adoption statute"5 or the Statute of Frauds. Typically the
contract to adopt upon which the action is based is an oral one. The
power of an equity court to issue a decree based on an oral contract
is clearly established in Missouri, notwithstanding the Statute of
Frauds. In Holloway v. Jones, 2 1 the court said that the Statute of
Frauds did not preclude enforcement of an oral contract to adopt
where the child had been given to the adoptive parents when she
was a small child with the understanding that they adopt her. The
child occupied the place of an only child in the adoptive family, with
her natural parents giving up all control over her. The court said the
child had become in equity the daughter of the adoptive parents,
without regard to the Statute of Frauds. It is also clear that Missouri
courts will enforce a contract to adopt despite failure to comply with
the statutory requirements for a valid adoption. In Menes v.
Cowgill, 27 the Missouri Supreme Court said:
121. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
122. McCary v. McCary, 239 S.W. 848 (Mo. 1922).
123. Hegger v. Kausler, 303 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. 1957); Capps v. Adamson, 362 Mo. 539,
242 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. 1951); Drake v. Drake, 328 Mo. 966, 43 S.W.2d 556 (En Banc 1931).
124. Lukas v. Hays, 283 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1955); Thomas v. Malone, 142 Mo. App. 193,
126 S.W. 522 (K.C. Ct. App. 1910).
125. §§ 453.010-.170, RSMo 1969.
126. 246 S.W. 587 (Mo. 1922).
127. 359 Mo. 697, 223 S.W.2d 412 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 949 (1950); Drake v.
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The present and prior statutory enactments, however, did not oust
a court of equity of jurisdiction to decree an adoption in a proper
case, where the facts warrant it, although the statutory methods
of adoption were not complied with .... "I
The petitioner has the burden of proving the adoption con-
tract."9 In order to prove an oral contract of adoption there must be
substantial evidence. The courts have usually said that they will
view the evidence with "especial strictness" 3 ' and that it must be
so clear, cogent, and convincing as to leave no reasonable doubt as
to the existence of a contract to adopt. 3' The rationale for these
requirements is that the policy of the Statute of Frauds demands
that verbal evidence, when it is sought to be used in lieu of writing,
be closely scrutinized.'32 In order for the petitioner to obtain a decree
of equitable adoption he must also prove that there existed a parent-
child relationship-i.e., that the petitioner fulfilled the role of a
child'33 and that the petitioner was treated as a child of the adoptive
parent.'34 Furthermore, the contract itself must be one which the
court is willing to enforce upon equitable principles. This gives a
court discretion to determine whether to issue a decree of equitable
adoption. The Missouri Supreme Court, in Hegger v. Kausler,35
phrased the proposition as follows:
If one takes a child into his home as his own, assumes and performs
the duties and burdens incident to parenthood and, in turn, exacts
of and receives from the child the obedience, services, love and
duties of a natural child, the courts may, if justice and good faith
require it, hold such person estopped to deny that he voluntarily
assumed the status of a parent and that the child thereby has
become the equitably adopted child of such person.' 8
Behind the courts' refusal to decree an equitable adoption except
where justice and good faith so require is a fear that if equitable
Drake, 328 Mo. 966, 43 S.W.2d 556 (En Banc 1931); McCary v. McCary, 239 S.W. 848 (Mo.
1922); McCormick v. Johnson, 441 S.W.2d 724 (St. L. Mo. App. 1969).
128. 359 Mo. at 705, 223 S.W.2d at 416.
129. Capps v. Adamson, 362 Mo. 539, 242 S.W.2d 556 (1951).
130. Hogane v. Ottersbach, 269 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1954).
131. Lukas v. Hays, 283 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1955); Bland v. Buoy, 335 Mo. 967,74 S.W.2d
612 (1934).
132. Capps v. Adamson, 362 Mo. 539, 242 S.W.2d 556 (1951).
133. Taylor v. Coberly, 327 Mo. 940, 38 S.W.2d 1055 (1931).
134. Hegger v. Kausler, 303 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. 1957).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 88.89.
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adoptions were liberally decreed, it would invite fraud and make
people reluctant to take children into their homes."7
While the Missouri adoption statute allows legally adopted
children to inherit from collateral relatives, it is clear that an equi-
tably adopted child may not inherit from collateral relatives."8 Fi-
nally, it is also clear that, in Missouri, a court of equity will go no
further than a declaration of the child as heir of the adoptive par-
ent.,
39
In summary, if an illegitimate child has lived with his father
pursuant to an express or implied contract to adopt and a parent-
child relationship has existed, then the action of equitable adoption
makes it possible for the child to become an heir of his father. It
should be remembered, however, that the courts view the evidence
with special strictness and the petitioner must prove adoption by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. If that burden of proof is
met, then the illegitimate child may share equally with any legiti-
mate children in his father's estate.
B. Suit to Establish Heirship
Missouri statutes do not define "child" or "children" when
used in a will. Section 474.430, RSMo 1969, merely provides:
All courts and others concerned in the execution of last wills shall
have due regard to the directions of the will, and the true intent
and meaning of the testator, in all matters brought before them.
Nor have Missouri courts judicially defined the words "child" or
"children" when used in a will. Apparently only one Missouri appel-
late decion has considered the problem. In Gates v. Seibert,' John
Gates bequeathed property to his son, Jacob, and Jacob's wife, if
he should marry, and after the son's death, to the son's children.
Jacob had one child born out of wedlock. Subsequently, Jacob mar-
ried the mother of this child and recognized the child as his own.
Jacob's marriage also produced two legitimate children. The Mis-
souri Supreme Court held that the illegitimate child was legitimized
by the marriage and subsequent recognition and could therefore
share in the class gift to Jacob's children. The court, in dictum,
stated:
137. Id. Benjamin v. Cronan, 338 Mo. 1177, 93 S.W.2d 975 (1936).
138. Menes v. Cowgill, 359 Mo. 697, 707-08, 223 S.W.2d 412, 418 (1949).
139. Long v. Willey, 391 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Mo. 1965).
140. 157 Mo. 254, 57 S.W. 1065 (En Banc 1900).
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When the law uses the word "children", it means legitimate chil-
dren; and, when that word is used in a will or deed, it is to be
understood as used in that sense, unless something else appears to
indicate that a different meaning was intended.'
The dictum in Gates v. Seibert seems to represent the common
law rule that the word "children" when used in a will is presumed
to mean legitimate children in the absence of language expressing
a contrary intent."' Originally the common law rule precluded the
use of extrinsic evidence to ascertain the intention of the testator.'
Some courts have modified the common law rule by holding that,
although the testator is presumed to mean legitimate children when
the word "children" is used in a will, this presumption can be rebut-
ted by the use of extrinsic evidence to the contrary.' Iowa has
rejected the common law rule and held that where terms such as
"children," "grandchildren," or "nephews" are used in a will and
there are both legitimate and illegitimate descendants and the tes-
tator's intention is not clearly expressed in the will, then the use of
the words creates no presumption; the words are ambiguous so that
the testator's intention may be determined from both the provisions
of the will and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
will.' Recent cases in both Wisconsin and Georgia have stated that
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will may be
introduced to show the testator's intent in using the word "chil-
dren" in his will.'46 The Wisconsin court held that by using the word
"children" the testator is presumed to have meant legitimate chil-
dren. The presumption can be rebutted by special circumstances.
These special circumstances exist: (1) where the only children in
existence were illegitimate children and the testator knew that the
children were illegimate; or (2) where the illegitimate child was part
of "the family circle."' 47
141. Id. at 272, 57 S.W. at 1068.
142. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Attorney General, 326 Mass. 532, 95 N.E.2d 649 (1950);
In re Trust of Parsons, 56 Wis. 2d 613, 203 N.W.2d 40 (1973).
143. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Attorney General, 326 Mass. 532, 95 N.E.2d 649 (1950);
Hammond v. Pennsylvania R.R., 54 N.J. Super. 149, 148 A.2d 515, rev'd, 31 N.J. 244, 156
A.2d 689 (1959).
144. Cooper v. Melvin, 154 S.E.2d 373 (Ga. 1967); In re Estate of Ellis, 225 Ia. 1279,
282 N.W. 758 (1938); In re Trust of Parsons, 56 Wis. 2d 613, 203 N.W.2d 40 (1973).
145. In re Estate of Ellis, 225 Ia. 1279, 282 N.W. 758 (1938).
146. Cooper v. Melvin, 154 S.E.2d 373 (Ga. 1967); In re Trust of Parsons, 56 Wis. 2d
613, 203 N.W.2d 40 (1973).
147. In re Trust of Parsons, 56 Wis. 2d 613, 203 N.W.2d 40 (1973).
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Although there is no certainty that Missouri appellate courts
will accept the dictum in Gates v. Seibert,' there is a strong argu-
ment that the court should follow either the Iowa or Wisconsin
approach. The underlying policy of will interpretation in Missouri
is to discover the intention of the testator.' In order to determine
the testator's intent, Missouri courts have used, among others, two
rules of construction. First, the testator's intent must be gleaned
solely from the four corners of the will if the language used in the
will is clear and well-defined. Accordingly, extrinsic evidence of the
testator's intent cannot be adduced to qualify, explain, enlarge, or
contradict the language. 5 ' Second, if the language used in the will
is ambiguous and the testator's intent is not clear, Missouri courts
will admit extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the will to explain what the testator has written.,'" The
word "children" as used in a will should fall within the second rule
of construction if the testator does not, in the will, explain the
meaning of the term; otherwise, the testator's true intention is not
clear from the four corners of the will. This is because, as noted
earlier, there is no definitive case law interpreting the word "chil-
dren" when used in a will. Thus, unless the testator's intent is clear
from the will itself, extrinsic evidence as to the circumstances sur-
rounding the execution of the will should be admissible to prove
whether by use of the term "children" the testator intended to in-
clude an illegitimate child within the class gift. Next, it can be
argued that R - v. R ,11 stands for the proposition that illegi-
timate children in Missouri should be treated equally with legiti-
mate children. This policy should not be thwarted by the use of a
conclusive common law presumption that the word "children"
means legitimate children; rather, this policy of equal treatment is
best served if the testator's true intent is discovered through the use
of all possible evidence, including extrinsic evidence. Thus, a neu-
tral rule of construction should be applied, favoring neither legiti-
mate nor illegitimate children. Accordingly, the Missouri courts
should disregard the Gates dicta and permit the use of extrinsic
evidence to ascertain the testator's true intent in using the word
"children" in his will.
148. 159 Mo. 254, 57 S.W. 1065 (En Banc 1900).
149. § 474.430, RSMo 1969.
150. First Nat'l Bank v. Solomon, 412 S.W.2d 458 (Mo. 1967); First Nat'l Bank v. Hyde,
363 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. 1962).
151. Lehmann v. Janes, 409 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. 1966).
152. 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
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The causes of action discussed in this comment obviously do
not provide an illegitimate child in Missouri true equality with a
legitimate child. Nevertheless, the mere existence of these actions
means that the father can no longer treat the illegimate child as a
filius nultius, a son of nobody. The father may be forced to provide
support to his illegitimate child, either directly or indirectly, and,
under the proper circumstances, the child may receive a share of his
father's estate. The trend in Missouri, and also in other states and
on the federal level, is toward requiring the father of an illegitimate
child to be more responsible for the necessities of the child. This
trend appears to be based upon the social policy that, because the
father played an equal role with the mother in creating the child,
they both should be responsible for the child's support.
In Missouri, the illegitimate child has not fared well with re-
spect to the right to share in his father's estate. The illegitimate
child is deemed to be an heir only of his mother's estate. If he has
been equitably adopted by his father, however, the child becomes
an heir of his father's estate. Equitable adoption, though not
granted without substantial supportive evidence, has provided relief
in a number of cases. The concept should continue to provide a
method for an illegitimate child, raised by his father, to obtain a
share of his father's estate. Obviously, an illegitimate child may be
specifically provided for in his father's will. If, however, the father
merely bequeaths property to his "children," then a problem may
arise. Nevertheless, the illegitimate child should be allowed to prove
that he was intended to be included within the term "children," and
thereby receive a share of the estate.
Although the illegitimate child in Missouri is not treated
equally with a legitimate child, the causes of action discussed in this
comment may serve as a basis for establishing the father's respon-
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